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Summary. In this paper we explore the link between wealth inequality and stability in
a two-sector neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents. The stability of the
steady state depends on the various parameters of the model and in particular on individ-
ual preferences. We show that when consumers have identical preferences and the inverse
of absolute risk aversion (or risk tolerance) is a strictly convex function, inequality is a
factor that favors instability. In the opposite case, inequality favors stability. Our charac-
terization also shows that whenever absolute risk tolerance is linear, as when preferences
exhibit hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA), wealth heterogeneity is neutral. As
there is not yet evidence on the concavity of absolute risk tolerance, our results unfortu-
nately do not lead to a unique conclusion on the sign of the effect of wealth inequality on
stability.
Economic growth, Heterogeneity, Wealth and Income Inequality, Instability.
JEL-classification numbers: D30, D50, D90, O41.
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1 Introduction
The relation between wealth or income inequality and growth has been explored in a large
number of theoretical and empirical studies (recent surveys are Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-
Penalosa (1999) and Benabou (2000)). In the present paper we focus on how inequality
affects the dynamics of a two-sector neoclassical growth model. Dynamic considerations
are relevant for this issue as there is no a priori reason to believe that economies are on
their balanced growth path. The channel we consider is rather straightforward. Wealth
heterogeneity affects the ”social” utility function and conesquently the stability proper-
ties of the equilibrium even in the absence of heterogeneity in preferences. The issue is
then to relate plausible specifications of preferences with the direction of the effect of
heterogeneity.
We adopt the simple version of the neoclassical two-sector growth model with a sin-
gle consumption good considered by Boldrin and Deneckere (1990) but we abandon the
representative agent assumption and admit non-linear utility functions. Agents may be
heterogeneous in respect to the share of the initial stock of capital and in labor endow-
ments, as well as in preferences. As labor is provided inelastically labor endowments are
considered as exogenous parameters. Furthermore, due to the structure of the model
individual characteristics and heterogeneity do not affect the steady state values of the
aggregate variables.
The analysis is standard for economies with heterogenous agents. First, we focus on
the properties of the Pareto optimal allocations. These are obtained as solutions to a
social planner’s problem characterized by a utility function depending on the welfare
weights. In the model, these weights are continuous functions of the initial conditions
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(see Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2001) and Ghiglino (2002)). Consequently, the local
dynamic properties of the general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and those
of the planner’s problem with the welfare weights fixed at their steady state values are
identical. We are then able to obtain the dynamic properties of the equilibrium path in
the aggregate variables for exogenously fixed welfare weights. Decentralization of these
equilibria only occurs at a second stage of our analysis where we characterize the effect
of agent’s heterogeneity on dynamics.
Ii is known that for some plausible specification of technology and preferences this model
exhibit instability and fluctuations (Boldrin and Deneckere (1990) and Ghiglino and
Olszak-Duquenne (2001)). Here we give the conditions on the individual utility func-
tions such that wealth heterogeneity favors instability and the conditions such that the
opposite occurs. We find that when the inverse of absolute risk aversion is a concave func-
tion heterogeneity favors stability. The result is driven by the fact that stability depends
monotonously on absolute risk tolerance, at least over the relevant range. Consequently,
the characterization involves the concavity of absolute risk tolerance, i.e. the derivatives
of the utility function as high as the fourth order. Unfortunately there is little direct
empirical evidence concerning their value and sign. Some weak and indirect evidence
in support of the concavity of absolute risk tolerance can be found (see Gollier (2001)).
According to the present paper, this evidence would suggest that agent’s heterogeneity
favors stability. On the other hand, for the class of preferences exhibiting hyperbolic
absolute risk aversion (HARA) income heterogeneity is neutral.
The tractability of the model is based on some simplifying assumptions. First, there
is only one consumption good and one capital good. Second, as the production func-
tions are analytically specified the technology is implicitly restricted to belong to some
class. Finally, labor is provided inelastically. The values of the parameters giving rise to
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fluctuations in the present model are not particularly plausible (see for ex. Boldrin and
Deneckere (1990)). However, we don’t think this is a major weakness as many subsequent
papers have shown that fluctuations are possible with reasonable parameter values in two-
sector growth model. We also believe that our results hold in more general frameworks.
However, more research is needed to quantify this statement.
Beside Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2001) the present paper is related to Ghiglino
and Sorger (2002). In that paper, indeterminacy is shown to occur in a continuous time,
endogenous growth model with an externality and heterogeneous agents. However, their
analysis fail to qualify the effects of redistributions on the occurrence of indeterminacy
because the welfare weights cannot be proven to be continuous functions of the initial
conditions.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the model is introduced while the equilibria
are defined in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on the relationship between endowment distri-
bution and instability. In section 5 the occurrence of instability is related to heterogeneity.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
In the present paper we consider a competitive two-sector economy with heterogenous
agents. The technology is formalized as in Boldrin and Deneckere (1990). There is no
joint-production and firms produce according to constant returns production functions
so that at the optimum, profits are zero. There are two produced goods, a consumption
good and a capital good. The consumption good cannot be used as capital so it is
entirely consumed. The capital good cannot be consumed. There are two inputs, capital
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and labor. We also suppose that there is instantaneous capital depreciation and that
labor is inelastically used in production.
There are two firms, one for each sector. The firm in the first sector produces a con-
sumption good from capital and labor according to a production function F 1(k1, l1). We
assume that F 1(k1, l1) = (l1)α(k1)1−α with α ∈ (0, 1) where l1, k1 are the amount of cap-
ital and labor used by the firm of the consumption sector. In a decentralized economy,
the firm maximizes profit
Max p1t F
1(k1t , l
1
t )− p2t−1k1t − wtl1t
where p1t is the present price of the consumption good at period t, p
2
t−1 is the present price
of the capital good bought at period t− 1 and wt the present price of labor at period t.
In the second sector, the representative firm produces a capital good according to a
Leontief function F 2(k2, l2) = Min (l2, k
2
γ ) with γ ∈ (0, 1). The optimal production plan
for this firm is
l2t =
k2t
γ
There are n agents. In each period consumers provide inelastically a constant amount of
labor ωi, i = 1, ..., n with
∑n
i=1 ωi = 1. A model in which the amount of labor provided is
endogenously determined could be analyzed but at a much higher cost. At the beginning
of the economy, each agent i is endowed with a fixed share θi of the initial stock k0
of capital, with
∑n
i=1 θi = 1. Consumer’s preferences are characterized by a discounted
utility function of the form
U i(xi) =
∞
∑
t=0
δt ui(xit)
where xit is the consumption of agent i at time t and xi is its intertemporal consumption
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stream. We assume δ > γ. The instantaneous utility function fulfills the Inada condition
lim
xit→0
u′i(xit) = +∞.
In a decentralized economy, an agent i maximizes his utility function subject to a single
budget constraint
∞
∑
t=0
p1t xit =
∞
∑
t=0
wtωi + θik0 with i = 1, ..., n.
where we have normalized the price of k0 to unity.
3 Competitive equilibria and the path of capital
In the present economy the first welfare theorem holds. Every competitive equilibrium
obtained in the decentralized economy is a Pareto optimum in the sense that it is the
solution to the maximization of a social welfare function. In the current section we first
define competitive equilibria and then characterize the set of Pareto optima.
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices (p1t , p
2
t , wt)
∞
t=0 such that
markets clear for every t ≥ 0
• l1t +l2t =
∑n
i=1 ωi= 1
• k 1t+1+k 2t+1= F 2(k
2
t , l
2
t )
• ∑ni=1 xit = F 1 (k1t , lx 1t )
• k 10 +k 20= k 0 with k 0 given
where
• (xit) is a solution to the individual maximization program of agent i, i = 1, ..., n for
(p1t , p
2
t , wt)
∞
t=0.
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• (kjt , ljt ) is a solution to profit maximization for firm j, j = 1, 2 for (p1t , p2t , wt)∞t=0.
Every competitive equilibrium is a Pareto optimal allocation. A Pareto optimal allocation
is a solution to the planner’s problem for a given vector of welfare weights µ ∈ [0, 1]n−1:
Max
n−1
∑
i=1
(µi
∞
∑
t=0
δt ui(xit)) + (1−
n−1
∑
i=1
µi)
∞
∑
t=0
δt un(xnt)
s.t.
n
∑
i=1
xit = F 1(k1t , l
1
t ) for all t
k1t+1 + k
2
t+1 = F
2(k2t , l
2
t ) for all t
l1t + l
2
t = 1 for all t
k0 given
The solution to the above program depends on the vector µ and on k0. The set of Pareto
optima is obtained when µ spans [0, 1]n−1 with
∑n−1
i=1 µi ≤ 1. A given competitive equilib-
rium is obtained for a µ such that the associated allocations saturate the budget constraint
of all the consumers.
Note also that the solutions are interior as soon as ωi 6= 0 or θi 6= 0 for i = 1, .... As shown
in Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2001) this is a consequence of the Inada conditions on
preferences and technology.
Let uµ be a social utility function defined by
uµ(x) = Max
n−1
∑
i=1
µiui(xit) + (1−
n−1
∑
i=1
µi) un(xnt)
s.t
n
∑
i=1
xit = x
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Let T (k, y) be the usual transformation function giving the maximal output in the capital
good compatible with total capital input k and to consumption output at least equal to
y. With the specification of production adopted through the paper T (k, y) = (1−y)α(k−
γ y)1−α. Let the return function be V : R+ × R+ → R defined by V (k, y) = uµ(T (k, y)).
Then the planner’s problem is equivalent to
Max
∞
∑
t=0
δtV (kt, kt+1)
s.t. F 2(kt, 1) ≥ kt+1
k0 given
Note that the solution depends on k0.
In the present framework it is a standard result that the set of interior Pareto optima are
the set of {kt}t that satisfies the transversality condition limt−→∞ δtV1(kt, kt+1)kt = 0 and
are solutions to the system
V2(kt, kt+1) + δV1(kt+1, kt+2) = 0 ∀t ≥ 0
where Vj represents the first order derivative in respect to the jth argument.
An interior aggregate steady state is a sequence kt = k∗, ∀t ≥ 0, that solves the set of
Euler equation. The steady state capital k∗ can be expressed as a function of the discount
factor and the technology parameters only
k∗ =
(1− α)(γ − δ)
γ − α− δ(1− α)
.
The aggregate consumption x∗ can also be obtained
x∗ = T (k∗, k∗) = k∗(k∗−1 − 1)α(1− γ)1−α.
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Note that at the steady state, aggregate capital and consumption depend only on the
total labor supply. This property is a consequence of the fact that at the steady state the
return function can be eliminated from the Euler equation.
Near the steady state the behavior of the dynamic system is equivalent to the behavior of
the linearized system. The dynamic properties of the steady state are then related to the
eigenvalues of the matrix associated to the linearized system. In particular, the stability
property of the steady state depends on how the modulus of the two eigenvalues compare
to one. In fact, these can be shown to depend on the first and second order derivatives of
the instantaneous utility function.
Definition 2 Let u be the social utility function, u : R+ → R. Let ρ(x) = −
u′(x)
u′′(x)
be the
inverse of the absolute risk aversion, also called absolute risk tolerance..
For a given discount factor and technology parameters, the eigenvalues depend on ρ. The
relationship is represented in Fig. 1 where p1 is the eigenvalue with the smallest modulus,
i.e. | p1 |<| p2 |. Note that ρ is positive and that ρ close to zero indicates a high degree
of curvature of the utility function. A property which plays an important role in the
subsequent developments is that at most one of the two graphs p1(ρ) and p2(ρ) intersects
the horizontal line drawn at −1. This is a consequence of the fact that the branches of
pi(ρ) are monotonous for large values of ρ.
The graphs pi(ρ), i = 1, 2, depend on the parameters (α, γ, δ). A change in one of the
parameters modify the graphs. The following Lemma gives the stability properties of the
steady state as a function of the technology parameters, the aggregate endowments, the
discount factor and absolute risk tolerance ρ.
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Lemma 1 Let δc = γ1−2α , δcc =
α+γ
1−α . Then,
1. If α ≥ 0.5(1− γ) then the stability of the steady state is independent of ρ.
2. If α < 0.5(1− γ) and δ /∈]δc, δcc[ then the steady state is (saddle-path) stable.
3. If α < 0.5(1− γ) and δ ∈]δc, δcc[ then
ρ ≥ ρc ⇔ Unstable steady state
ρ ∈ [0, ρc[ ⇔ Stable steady state
with
ρc =
2α(α− 1)(1 + δ)δ
δ2(2α− 1)(α− 1) + δ(2α2 − α(1− 3γ)− 2γ) + γ(α + γ)
k∗(k∗
−1−1)α(1−γ)1−α.
Proof: The issue is to find ρc such that λ1 = −1. For a proof see Ghiglino and Olszak-
Duquenne [11]. Q.E.D
Remark: For any given set of admissible parameters (α, γ, δ), there exists a value of the
absolute risk aversion of the social utility function, R0, such that for all economies with
a higher curvature, R > R0, the steady state of the reduced model is stable.
4 Instability in the heterogenous agents economy
The steady state value of individual consumption depends on the individual characteristics
because the return function depends on the welfare weights. The exact relationship is
provided by the following Lemma.
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Lemma 2 At a steady state k∗ the individual allocations are
xi∗(θi, ωi) =
x∗
1− γ
[ (δ(1− α) + α− γ)ωi + (1− δ)(1− α)θi ]
where x∗ = k∗(k∗−1 − 1)α(1− γ)1−α.
Proof: See Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2001). Q.E.D.
The curvature of the social utility function can now be expressed as a function of the
individual consumptions and therefore of the individual shares of capital and labor en-
dowments. We have the following result
Lemma 3 The absolute risk tolerance of the social utility function computed at the steady
state is given by
ρ((θi, ωi)
n
i=1) = −
n
∑
i=1
u′i
u′′i
(x ∗i (θi, ωi))
Proof: See appendix. Q.E.D
In the present general equilibrium model the social utility function depends on the welfare
weights. Furthermore, these depend on the equilibrium allocations which in turn depend
on the initial conditions and on the distribution of individual endowments. As a conse-
quence the characterization of the dynamic properties of the general equilibrium model
is hard to obtain, even when restricted to a neighborhood of the steady state. However,
in Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2001) it is shown that the local dynamic properties
of the general equilibrium model are related to the dynamic properties of an appropriate
”optimal growth” model.
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Lemma 4 The local stability properties of the general equilibrium model with endogenous
weights and of the model with the welfare weights fixed at their steady state values are
equivalent.
Proof: See Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2001). The proof is based on Kehoe, Levine
and Romer (1990) and Santos (1992). Q.E.D
The following Proposition gives the conditions for which heterogeneity matters. It is the
main result of this section.
Proposition 1 Let ρmin = min((θi,ωi)ni=1 ρ((θi, ωi)
n
i=1) and ρmax = max (θi,ωi)ni=1ρ((θi, ωi)
n
i=1).
Let also ρc, δc and δcc as defined in Lemma 1. Then
1. If δ /∈]δc, δcc[ then the steady state is (saddle-path) stable.
2. If δ ∈]δc, δcc[ and ρc ∈]ρmin, ρmax[ then the distribution of shares and/or labor en-
dowments matters, i.e. the stability of the steady state is affected by the distribution
of wealth. For ρ > ρc the steady state is unstable while it is stable for ρ ≤ ρc.
3. If δ ∈]δc, δcc[ and ρc /∈]ρmin, ρmax[ then the distribution of shares and/or labor en-
dowments don’t affect stability.
Proof: Obvious considering Lemma 1, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. Q.E.D
The previous result gives the conditions for which wealth heterogeneity matters for sta-
bility. In these, as we will see, preferences play a crucial role. In some cases, for example
when all consumers are characterized by identical CES utility function, ]ρmin, ρmax[ is
empty and Case 2 in Proposition 1 never occurs.
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5 On the effects of inequality on stability
In this section we establish the link between dynamic instability and agents heterogeneity.
When agents have identical preferences, the spread in individual wealth, i.e. in shares of
capital and/or labor endowments, gives a good indication of the level of heterogeneity of
the economy. Indeed, in this case the agents can be distributed on the real line according
to their wealth. In a purely homogeneous economy all consumers have the same wealth
while in an heterogenous economy actual individual wealth is spread over some interval.
There are several possible formal definitions. We chose the following.
Definition 3 Assume there are N types of consumers ordered according to their steady
state allocation, i.e. xi ≤ xj for i < j. Let ni(J) be the number of consumers of type i in
economy J and let n(J) be the corresponding distribution. Furthermore, assume that the
mean of the distribution
∑N
i=1 ni(J)xi is independent of J. Then Economy B is said to be
more heterogenous, or unequal, than Economy A iff B has more weight in the tails than
A, i.e. n(A) I n(B) where the ordering I is formally defined in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970).
Note that when considering the effect of a redistribution at most N = 2n types need to
be considered as there are at most n types in the initial configuration and at most n types
in the final configuration.
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) have shown the equivalence among a class of intuitive
notions of spread. In particular, they show that the notion in Definition 3 is equivalent to
the property that a spread in the distribution of consumer’s type decreases the expected
value of f(x) for any f continuous and concave, i.e.
∑2n
i=1 ni(A)f(xi) ≥
∑2n
i=1 ni(B)f(xi)
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for all continuous concave functions f .
That heterogeneity may have an effect on stability is a consequence of Proposition 1.
In fact this link is expected to hold under general conditions. However, it may also be
seen that the usual fundamental axioms on preferences don’t limit the sign of the effect.
The reason is that the occurrence of instability depends on the third and fourth order
derivatives of the utility functions. Standard assumptions on preferences do not put any
limitation on these and direct empirical data is also lacking. However, some indirect
evidence on the properties of absolute risk aversion and its inverse, sometimes called
absolute risk tolerance, exist or could be obtained soon. Our condition therefore involves
absolute risk tolerance.
Proposition 2(i) When inequality is good for stability Assume that the inverse of
absolute risk aversion is a strictly concave function. Provided heterogeneity affects stability
(Case 2 of Proposition 1 occurs) there exists a distribution n(0) such that the steady state
is locally stable for any economy J with n(0) I n(J) and is unstable otherwise.
Proposition 2(ii) When equality is good for stability Assume that the inverse of
absolute risk aversion is a strictly convex function. Provided heterogeneity affects stability
(Case 2 of Proposition 1 occurs) there exists a distribution n(0) such that the steady state
is locally stable for any economy J with n(J) I n(0) and is unstable otherwise.
Proof: Let ui(x) = v(x). Let i = 1, ..., N be the subscript indicating the type and let ni
indicate the number of consumers of type i. Lemma 3 gives
ρ((θi, ωi)Ni=1) = −
N
∑
i=1
ni
v′
v′′
(x∗i (θi, ωi))
Provided W (x) = − v
′(x)
v′′(x) is a concave function, Definition 3 and the discussion thereafter
implies that B is more heterogeneous than A iff
∑N
i=1 ni(A)W (xi) ≥
∑N
i=1 ni(B)W (xi).
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If we define ρ(J) as the value of ρ((θi, ωi)Ni=1) associated to the distribution ni(J) the
previous condition becomes iff ρ(A) ≥ ρ(B). On the other hand, according to Lemma
1 an increase in ρ favors instability. Therefore, when individual absolute risk tolerance
W (x) is a concave function heterogeneity favors stability (Proposition 2(i)). The second
part of the result is proven similarly. Q.E.D.
The traditional theory of precautionary saving requires the third derivative to be positive
while the fourth derivative is unconstrained. Recent research suggests that a positive third
order derivative is not sufficient for the expected wealth accumulation to be increasing
with the earning risks (see Huggett and Vidon (2002)). A sufficient condition is that
v′(x)v′′′(x)
(v′′(x))2 is a constant k with k > 0, implying that the utility function belongs to a subset
of the HARA class (see Caroll and Kimball (1996)). Note that this class include most
of the commonly used specifications, as the CARA and CRRA. As (R−1(x))′′ = ( v
′(x)
v′′(x))
′′
= ( (v
′′(x))2−(v′(x)v′′′(x)
(v′′(x))2 )
′ = (−v
′(x)v′′′(x)
(v′′(x))2 )
′ it is straightforward to realize that in all these cases
heterogeneity doesn’t affect stability.
Corollary 1 HARA preferences Assume that individual preferences can be represented
by a utility function of the HARA class, i.e. v(x) = 1−γγ (
ax
1−γ + b)
γ with a, b and γ as
parameters. Then wealth inequality plays no role in the stability of the steady state.
Nothing in the data indicates that the analysis should be confined to the HARA class.
However, although there are good reasons to believe that absolute risk aversion is convex
the evidence on the concavity of its inverse is not conclusive (see Gollier (2001)). Clearly
more research is needed before we can apply our results to conclude on the sign of the
effect of wealth heterogeneity on stability.
Remark: The conditions in Proposition 2 can be expressed in terms of the derivatives of ab-
solute risk aversion R(x). Indeed, since (v′(x)/v′′(x))′ = (−1/R(x))′ = −(R2(x))−1R′(x)
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we obtain (−v′(x)/v′′(x))′′ = ((R2(x))−1R′(x))′ = R2(x)−1[R′′(x) − 2R(x)−1R′(x)2].
Therefore, if 2R′2(x)/R(x) < R′′(x) then W (x) = − v
′(x)
v′′(x) is strictly convex. Of course
this condition may be fulfilled only if absolute risk aversion is strongly strictly convex.
6 Conclusion
The present paper identifies within the chosen model the conditions on consumer’s pref-
erences such that wealth inequality favor instability and those that favor stability. The
paper also shows that there is a large set of economies such that heterogeneity is neutral,
and this set include all preferences satisfying the HARA property. The characterization
involves the concavity of absolute risk tolerance, i.e. the inverse of absolute risk aversion.
As reviewed by Gollier (2001), properties of the absolute risk tolerance play a crucial role
also in asset pricing theory and some effort is being devoted to find empirical evidence.
However, these findings do not lead to a conclusive evidence on the concavity of absolute
risk tolerance and therefore on the sign of the effect of wealth heterogeneity on stability.
It is an open question whether the results can be extended to a more general framework.
Two properties happened to be crucial. First, the welfare weights need to be continuous
functions of the initial conditions. Second, at most one of the two graphs representing
the eigenvalues of the dynamical system as a function of absolute risk tolerance, should
intersect the horizontal line drawn at −1. And this should occur only once. Provided
these two properties hold, the results can be extended to a completely general two-sector
economy. Similar conditions can be specified so that the result would hold in general
multi-sector models. It should also be pointed out that in our model heterogeneity in
individual productivity are not explicitly taken into account. However, as we allow for
15
heterogeneity in labor endowments, our model can be reinterpreted as to include different
levels of individual labor productivity.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 3.
Without loss of generality assume there are three types of consumers. Then the social
utility function is defined by
u(x) = Max µana ua(xa) + µb ubnb(xb) + (1− µa − µb)nc uc((x− naxa + nbxb)/nc)
The first and second order derivatives of the social utility function can be related to
the derivatives of the individual utility function of the agents. Indeed, the first order
conditions associated to the maximization problem that define the social utility function
give
Ψ1(xa, xb, x; µa, µb) = µana u′a(xa)− (1− µa − µb)na u′c((x− naxa + nbxb)/nc) = 0
Ψ2(xa, xb, x; µa, µb) = µbnb u′b(xb)− (1− µa − µb)nb u′c((x− naxa + nbxb)/nc) = 0
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Then the following expressions are easily obtained
u′(x) = (1− µa − µb) u′c((x− naxa + nbxb)/nc) = µana u′a(xa)
u′′(x) = µana u′′a(xa)
∂xa
∂x
where x represents the aggregate consumption. The implicit function theorem applied to
Ψ allows to express xa as a function of x near the steady state (x∗a, x
∗
b , x
∗). In matrix form
we can write,
(
∂xa
∂x
∂xb
∂x
)
=


∂Ψ1
∂xa
∂Ψ1
∂xb
∂Ψ2
∂xa
∂Ψ2
∂xb


−1 (
∂Ψ1
∂x
∂Ψ2
∂x
)
Some straightforward computations give
x′a(x
∗) =
∂x∗a
∂x
=
µcµbu′′b (x
∗
b)u
′′
c (x
∗
c)
µaµbncu′′a(x∗a)u′′a(x∗a) + µaµcnbu′′a(x∗a)u′′c (x∗c) + µbµcnau′′b (x∗b)u′′b (x∗b)
where µc = 1− µa − µb.
The result then follows from the definition of ρ.
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